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Introduction
Contrary to the Walrasian labor market model, various non-competitive models predict a positive relationship between wages of comparable workers and the performance of their …rms. Collective bargaining, optimal labor contract and search-theoretic models of the labor market share this theoretical conjecture, and consider di¤erent channels through which employer's ability to pay might a¤ect wages.
We can view the wage determination equations specifying the expected positive wage-performance link as reduced-form models stemming from, or at least compatible with, such an underlying variety of theoretical structural models. Many empirical studies have estimated these reduced-form wage equations on …rm data to test the rent-sharing hypothesis. 1 They have con…rmed without exception that changes in …rm performance feed through into changes in wages. In general, the estimated elasticities between wages and rents or pro…ts per employee range between 0.05, even less, and 0.20, depending in particular on the quality of the instruments used to control for the endogeneity of pro…ts. Following the seminal contribution of Abowd et al. (1999) , more recent studies using matched employer-employee datasets, are able to include separately in the wage equations …rm and worker e¤ects that take into account the non-random sorting of high-ability (and thus highwage) workers into high-pro…t …rms. Compared to studies based on …rm-level data only, these studies typically obtain, as expected, smaller estimates of wage-pro…t elasticities ranging from 0.01 to 0.10. 2 Even more recently, a small set of productivity studies have extended the more standard productivity framework with imperfect competition in the product market to encompass two polar models of wage determination in imperfect labor markets. 3 These studies have also been able to provide estimates of relative and absolute extent of rent sharing between …rms and workers, and more speci…cally estimates of the corresponding wage-pro…t elasticities which are higher, in the [0.10-0.50] range. 4 Our contribution to the empirical rent-sharing literature in this paper is to compare the rent- 1 See in particular Barth et al. (2016) for the US; Abowd and Lemieux (1993) for Canada; Teal (1996) for Ghana; Van Reenen (1996) and Hildreth (1998) 3 This extension of the econometric productivity model to take into account imperfect labor markets has been developed in Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2013) , after a …rst extension by Crépon et al. (2005) , and following the revival of the empirical literature on productivity with imperfect product markets (Hall, 1988) . Both extensions of econometric productivity analyses with imperfectly competitive product and labor markets …nd their historical roots in Marschak and Andrews (1944) . 4 sharing estimates obtained in the case of French manufacturing for a large matched …rm-worker panel data sample by relying on the wage determination and the productivity models. It is also to suggest potential explanations for the estimated discrepancies and to assess the advantages and shortcomings of both types of models.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the two econometric models while Section 3 describes the data and explains the method of estimation. Section 4 compares and discusses estimates of relative and absolute extent of rent sharing that we obtain from estimating the productivity and wage equations. Section 5 provides potential explanations of discrepancies between these estimates while Section 6 concludes.
Estimating rent sharing from two econometric models
We present in this Section the econometric reduced-form productivity and wage determination models as they have been usually speci…ed in the literature and as we take them here to the data to better compare the estimates of extent of rent sharing they entail.
Reduced-form model of productivity
The speci…cation of the reduced-form productivity equation we estimate is the following log-linear regression:
q it = [s N it (n it k it ) + s M it (m it k it )] + [s N it (k it n it )] + k it + ! it + i + t + it (1) where i is a …rm subscript and t a year subscript. The variables q it ; n it ; m it and k it are respectively for each year the logarithms of output Q it , labor N it , material input M it and capital K it . s N it and s M it are for each year the shares of labor costs and material costs in total revenue. The parameters , and are respectively the parameters of price-cost markup, joint product and labor market imperfections and elasticity of scale. ! it is an index of "true" total factor productivity, or productivity for short, possibly observed by the …rm at t when input choices are made, but unobserved to the econometrician. i is a …rm-speci…c e¤ect proxying for …rm unobserved heterogeneity such as managerial ability di¤erences, t is a year e¤ect proxying for changes in …rms'industrial environment, and it is an idiosyncratic error term including non-predictable output shocks and potential measurement error in output and inputs.
As explained in Section 1 of the online supplementary material, we can distinguish six combinations or regimes of imperfect and "perfect or nearly perfect" competition in product and labor markets, which are based on the respective values of the price-cost mark-up and joint market imperfections parameters and . We di¤erentiate imperfect and nearly perfect product market settings on the basis of a price-cost mark-up higher than 1.1. Similarly, we separate the two settings of imperfect competition in the labor market, e¢ cient bargaining and monopsony, from nearly perfect In the empirical literature, Eqs. (3) and (4) are commonly speci…ed as a log-log regression in which case the relative extent of rent sharing is a varying parameter equal to the wage-pro…t elasticity 2 multiplied by Ratio it = W it N it it , the ratio of the …rm wage bill to its pro…ts. 5 For our purpose of comparison, we compare as estimated in the productivity regression (Eq. (1)) with its sample average values as estimated in the wage regressions (Eqs. (3) and (4)):
= 2 Ratio with Ratio = mean
. The log speci…cation of the wage regressions has econometric advantages, in particular by normalizing the wage distributions which are skewed to the right and display long right tails (Neal and Rosen, 2000; Martins, 2007) . Adopting a log speci…cation of both the productivity and wage equations is also appropriate in our case since it allows us to control for a potential source of discrepancy in the corresponding estimates of extent of rent sharing.
In practice, Eqs. (3) and (4) usually do not include the capital intensity variable and we also consider an estimation variant without it. We think it is preferable to take it here into account to control at least partly for di¤erences in …rms'labor skill composition and the possibility that rent sharing is relatively higher in capital-intensive …rms. Skill-intensive …rms will also be capital-intensive in industries where capital and skilled labor are complements (Griliches, 1969; Bronars and Famulari, 2001; Du¤y et al., 2004) . This implies that the wage-pro…t elasticity estimates will be upwardly biased for lack of suitable skill composition data but less so if we control for …rm capital intensity.
Note, in a related way, that such skill bias is likely to be largely controlled for when we take into account the non-random sorting of high-ability (hence high-wage) workers into high-productivity (hence high-pro…t) …rms by relying on matched …rm-worker data. We thus expect that the wagepro…t elasticity will be less upwardly biased (hence smaller) when estimated in regression (4) than in regression (3).
3 Data description and econometric identi…cation
Comparative analysis sample and measurement of variables
We have constructed an unbalanced panel of French manufacturing …rms over the period 1984-2001, based on con…dential databases maintained by INSEE (the French "Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques"): mainly …rm accounting information from EAE ("Enquête Annuelle d'Entreprise"), supplemented by matched …rm-worker data drawn from the DADS (the administrative database of "Déclarations Annuelles des Données Sociales"). We …rst trimmed the data to eliminate outliers and anomalies for our main variables: …rm output and input growth rates, …rm input shares in total revenue, …rm average wages and pro…ts, and worker net earnings. We then only kept …rms with consecutive observations for at least four years and retained workers who remained in the same …rms ("stayers"), worked twelve months per year and with consecutive observations for at least two years. We also retained the subset of 25 industries where we expect rent sharing to be predominant, chosen among the full set of 52 manufacturing industries de…ned on the basis of the 2-and 3-digit level of the French industrial classi…cation ("Nomenclature économique de synthèse"). This subset amounts to 66% of the …rms and 58% of employment in total manufacturing.
We thus end up with a matched …rm-worker panel data sample, consisting at the …rm level of 109,199 observations for 9,849 …rms over the 18 years 1984-2001 , with a median number of observations per …rm of 11, and at the worker-…rm level of 382,501 observations for 60,294 workers in the 9,849 …rms, with a median number of 9 workers per …rm.
The eleven variables involved in our regression analyses are de…ned and measured in the following way. Output (Q it ) is de…ned as current production de ‡ated by the two-digit producer price index. Labor (N it ) refers to the average number of employees in each …rm for each year. Material input (M it ) is de…ned as intermediate consumption de ‡ated by the two-digit intermediate consumption price index. The capital stock (K it ) is measured by the gross book value of tangible …xed assets at the beginning of the year and adjusted for in ‡ation. The shares of labor (s N it ) and material input (s M it ) are constructed by dividing respectively the …rm total labor cost and intermediate consumption by the …rm current production and by taking the average of these ratios over adjacent years. The …rm average wage per worker (W it ) is computed as the wage bill divided by the average number of employees. The worker net wage (W j(i)t ) is the yearly net earnings of worker j in …rm i and the number of workers N j(i)t refers to the number of individual workers observed for …rm i in the matched …rm-worker sample. The …rm pro…ts ( it ) is simply the widely used measure of gross operating pro…t computed as value added minus labor costs, smoothed over four or …ve years if possible from year t 3 or t 4 to current year t (taking advantage of the availability of three year pre-sample accounting …rm observations when necessary). Such smoothing, often done in practice, is useful to control for the high volatility of pro…ts. Finally, we rely on the matched …rm-worker data to propose a measure of the average workers'alternative wage (W it ) for the two wage regressions. In particular, we proxy the alternative wage by the 5 th percentile of the workers'wage distribution but also consider an estimation variant in which it is measured by the 1 st percentile.
<Insert Table 1 about here> Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for all our variables: mean, standard deviation, and …rst quartile, median and third quartile. The median number of employees is 49 and the mean number 123, while the median number of individual workers observed per …rm is 9 and the mean number 21. The average yearly growth rate over the period 1984-2001 of …rm output, number of employees, materials and capital are respectively 2.6%, 0.9%, 4.4% and 0.3%. The average shares of labor and materials in total revenue are of 33% and 49%. The median and mean are both of about 27,000 Euros for the workers'wage per year and respectively about 13,500 and 16,000 Euros for their net earnings, while they amount to about 13,500 and 20,000 Euros per year for smoothed pro…ts per employee.
Econometric identi…cation and estimation
In the reduced-form productivity regression (Eq. (1)), we cannot assume that the input factor variables n it , m it and k it are exogenous, even when we control for …rm e¤ects, and we cannot in general rely on ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation, even if we control for …rm …xed e¤ects by relying on the time dimension of the panel (i.e., the …rst-di¤erence or within-…rm dimension of the data). The crux of the identi…cation problem inherent in estimating Eq. (1) is that a …rm's choice of inputs (n it ; m it ; k it ) will likely depend on realized …rm-speci…c productivity ! it , which only the …rm observes. Hence, we have to use an instrumental variable (IV) estimation method (as emphasized in the econometric production function literature since Marshak and Andrews, 1944; see also Griliches and Mairesse, 1998; Ackerberg et al., 2015) . Similarly, we cannot assume that in the wage regressions (Eqs. (3) and (4)), the right-hand-side variables, in particular the pro…t-peremployee variable ( it n it ), are exogenous. Hence, they need to be instrumented. The endogeneity of pro…ts is due to two sources of reverse causality. First, the wage-pro…t elasticity (the parameter by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) , which is designed for panels with relatively small time and large cross-sectional dimensions, covariates that are not strictly exogenous, unobserved heterogeneity, heteroscedasticity and within-…rm autocorrelation. This method extends the …rst-di¤erenced GMM estimation method of Arellano and Bond (1991) , by relying on a richer set of orthogonality conditions, which are obtained not only by using lagged variables in levels to instrument the equation written in …rst-di¤erences, but also by using the lagged variables in …rst-di¤erences to instrument the original equation in levels. Actually, to avoid instrument proliferation, we only exploit the orthogonality conditions entailing as instruments the 2-and 3-year lags of variables in levels and the 1-year lag of the …rst-di¤erenced variables. We also use the two-step SYS-GMM estimator which is asymptotically more e¢ cient than the one-step SYS-GMM estimator and robust to heteroscedasticity, and the …nite-sample correction to the two-step covariance matrix developed by Windmeijer (2005) . 6 Data limitations precluded us from using exogenous …rm demand shifters as a source of variation in input demands to obtain consistent estimates of the parameters in the reduced-form productivity equation (Eq. (1)). We follow a common instrumentation strategy in the literature, which is using lagged internal values. More explicitly, we use suitable past levels and di¤erences of input factors as instruments for current inputs. This instrumentation strategy can be theoretically justi…ed through adjustment costs generating dependence of current input levels on past realizations of productivity shocks (see Bond and Söderbom, 2005) . Similarly, we lack exogenous …rm demand shifters as a source of variation of pro…ts that does not impact directly upon wages. Therefore, we follow common practice and use lagged values of …rm pro…tability as instruments (see e.g. Blanch ‡ower et al., 1996, Hildreth and Oswald, 1997), which in our case are suitable past levels and di¤erences of the smoothed pro…ts-per-employee variable.
We restrict estimation of Eq. (4) to individuals working in the same …rms across di¤erent years, i.e. we exclude worker mobility. Our motivation is twofold. First, we are primarily interested in obtaining consistent estimates of the wage-pro…t elasticity ( 2 ), rather than separately identifying unobserved worker and …rm heterogeneity j(i) and i , respectively themselves. Therefore, s = j(i) + i is de…ned as the unobserved spell e¤ect for worker-…rm spell s (Abowd et al., 1999; Andrews et al., 2006) . Second, although we have data for several years and for several individuals in the …rm, we could have chosen to control for unobserved worker heterogeneity as well as unobserved …rm heterogeneity in a single …xed-e¤ects estimation. The problem is, however, that separate identi…cation of both types of unobserved heterogeneity relies on workers who move between employers. This identi…cation strategy is only valid if workers'employer switches are exogenous and random, which is not likely to be the case (see Gibbons and Katz, 1992 ) and impossible to verify without having information on the reason of mobility.
Results of comparative analysis
We compare and discuss in this Section the industry-level estimates of relative and absolute extent of rent sharing b and b that we obtain from the productivity and two wage regressions (Eq. (1), Eqs. (3) and (4), respectively), and that we label b mixed picture, but not a bad one if we take into consideration that these correlations are computed for distributions of 25 estimates only, and they concern a subset of very diverse and heterogeneous industries.
<Insert Table 3 about here>   Table 4 gives the mean, …rst quartile Q 1 , median Q 2 and third quartile Q 3 of the three sets of industry estimates of rent sharing. It shows that the di¤erences between them in the mid-range of their distribution, from Q 1 to Q 3 , are roughly the same as already mentioned for the median: of 0.1 between the estimates from the two wage equations, and of 0.2 or 0.3 between them and the ones for the productivity equation. The …rst quartile value of b wage;w I is the only noteworthy exception to such nearly constant shift. By itself, it suggests that a common omitted variable misspeci…cation, namely workers'skill, could be a potential explanation to the extent that it would a¤ect the three sets of rent-sharing estimates di¤erentially. This is what we try to substantiate among other a priori sources of discrepancies in the next Section.
<Insert Table 4 about here>
Potential sources of discrepancies between rent-sharing estimates
We can a priori distinguish three large categories of reasons or sources of discrepancies that we …nd between the distributions of the industry rent-sharing parameters as estimated on the basis of the productivity and wage determination regressions (Eqs. (1), (3) and (4)).
A …rst category is economic speci…cation errors, which involve omitted relevant variables as well as poor measurement of included available variables. An important case, for the wage regressions, particularly for regression (3) , is the omission of a variable or group of variables of workers'skills because of the lack of suitable skill composition data at the …rm level. We expect that rent sharing is higher in skill-intensive …rms, and hence that wage-pro…t elasticities will be upwardly biased in the absence of skill variables in the two wage regressions. Actually, the omission of skill variables is the most likely source of the smaller estimates of rent sharing found with regression (4) than with regression (3). As already explained, the speci…cation of these two regressions is basically the same, their main di¤erence being that they are estimated at the worker-…rm level and …rm-level of our matched …rm-worker panel data sample. At the worker-…rm level, we can expect that the worker…rm e¤ect is positively correlated with the worker's skills. We know in fact that the assortative matching of …rms and workers is non-random, and that high-skilled (and thus high-wage) workers tend to be selected into high-productive (and thus high-pro…t) …rms (Abowd et al., 1999; Card et al., 2014).
As already mentioned, the introduction of the capital-per-employee variable in the two wage regressions is largely to proxy for the omission of skill variables. As capital-intensive …rms will also be skill-intensive in industries where capital and skilled labor are complements, we expect that wage-pro…t elasticity estimates will be less upwardly biased for lack of skill variables when the capital-per-employee variable is included in the wage regressions. This is indeed con…rmed if we estimate them without this variable. We …nd that the mean (or median) of the industry-level absolute extent of rent-sharing estimates b wage;f I and b wage;w I increase respectively from 0.17 to 0.25 (0.16 to 0.23) and from 0.10 to 0.14 (0.08 to 0.15), that is, in average by about respectively 50% and 40% (by about respectively 45% and 90%). In terms of comparison with the productivity regression industry estimates, when we do not include the capital-per-employee variable in the two wage regressions, the di¤erences between the mean (or median) industry-level absolute extent of rent-sharing estimates b decrease in average by about respectively 65% and 20% (by about respectively 55% and 35%).
A second category of potential sources of discrepancies between our reduced-form regression estimates of extent of rent sharing, which is closely related to the …rst category, concerns estimation methods, in particular the instrumentation strategy. Estimation of the productivity and the wage determination equations is based on exploiting di¤erent moment conditions for identi…cation. Since data limitations precluded us from relying on external a priori exogenous instruments, we followed, as we explained, the common method of using past di¤erences and levels of the regression variables themselves to construct such moment conditions. Since these variables are rather similar for the productivity and wages regressions, and hence the moment conditions based on their lagged di¤er-enced and level values are close, and since we have been attentive to check for their validity, it seems actually unlikely that estimation methods could be a signi…cant source of discrepancies between our rent-sharing estimates.
A third category relates to di¤erent underlying theoretical structural models, which are themselves speci…cally or loosely related to various interpretative schemes. As stressed from the outset, both the econometric productivity and wage determination regressions are reduced-form models. Given that our main interest is in the assessment and comparison of the …rm-worker rent-sharing parameters, the reduced-form regressions provide satisfactory results if the …rst and second categories of discrepancies remain unimportant, that is, if they are appropriately speci…ed and estimated. At the same time, we cannot and do not analyze the theoretical structural models which are possibly underlying these reduced-form models and are at least compatible with them. A consequence is that we are not able to decide between di¤erent interpretative schemes of our results, nor are we in a position to pin down the economic mechanisms and channels of rent sharing between …rms and their workers.
In the online supplementary material, we present one theoretical structural model behind the reduced-form productivity regression, in which case the interpretative scheme is collective bargaining. We also present three potential theoretical structural models which can substantiate the expected positive pay-performance link of the wage determination regressions: collective bargaining models, an optimal labor contract model and a search-theoretic model of the labor market. 8 In collective bargaining models, the existence and strength of workers' bargaining power, which can correspond to di¤erent practices, institutionalized or not, is central. 9 In optimal contract models in which both workers and …rms are risk-averse, the pay-performance link depends on the ratio of both parties'relative risk aversion parameters. 10 In two-sided search models with wage posting, the main source of rent sharing is competition between …rms to attract workers. Firms have an incentive to hire more workers, thereby reducing search costs. 11 This incentive is particularly pronounced for higher-productivity …rms because they face larger opportunity costs of search.
Although the three structural models can be developed analytically, their econometric analyses, in particular so that they could be compared together as well as with a structural productivity model with imperfections in product and labor markets, would be a formidable endeavor, if only because of multiple data constraints. To give two examples, one could estimate the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion from data on labor supply, but this would entail estimating wage and income elasticities, which could be done on the condition of having data on exogenous variation in unearned income and wages due to tax changes or lottery winnings. Similarly, one could attempt to quantify the extent to which search costs may drive a positive pay-performance link on the condition of having data on di¤erential hiring activities across …rms.
Conclusion
The basic objective of this paper is to compare as closely as possible rent-sharing estimates based on a reduced-form wage determination model adopted in a large empirical literature on …rm-worker rent-sharing with rent-sharing estimates based on a reduced-form productivity model developed more recently, which we consider as largely complementary and which we think should provide reconcilable estimates. Grounded on a large matched …rm-worker panel data sample, our main …nding is that industry distributions of rent-sharing estimates are well correlated and overlap, but are nonetheless signi…cantly di¤erent on average. Precisely, looking at the average industry estimates of the parameter of absolute extent of rent sharing, we obtain an estimate of 0.29 for the productivity regression and 0.17 for the wage determination regression if we rely only on …rm-level information. If we also take advantage of the worker-level information to control for unobserved worker ability in the model of wage determination, thereby accounting for non-random sorting of high-ability (and thus high-wage) workers into high-pro…t …rms, we …nd as expected a lower average value of 0.10.
There are a priori three large categories of reasons or potential sources of discrepancies that we …nd between the three types of estimates: economic speci…cation errors, which involve omitted relevant or poorly measured variables; estimation methods, particularly instrumentation strategy; and di¤erent underlying theoretical structural models related to a variety of interpretative schemes. The idea of addressing all these potential sources of discrepancies in an encompassing model would be a formidable challenge, if only because of speci…c data requirements.
Renouncing to consider it, we can think of two interesting routes for future research. The …rst is to analyze and test separately the potential sources of discrepancies between the econometric reducedform productivity and wage determination models, for example, by trying to take explicitly into account di¤erent workers'skills and by considering, more generally, that heterogeneity of …rms and workers, of markets and industries is likely to be a dominant driving source of the discrepancies in our present estimates. The latter could be investigated on various sets of speci…c detailed datasets, corresponding to di¤erent periods, countries, industries, labor and product markets.
A complementary route of research is to empirically and speci…cally relate the reduced-form productivity and wage regressions to their underlying structural models by econometrically specifying and testing them in a multi-equation framework. There already exist many attempts in such direction (e.g. Bughin 1993 Bughin , 1996 ; Jaumandreu and Mairesse, 2010; Forlani et al., 2016, Peters et al., 2017), but they still raise numerous di¢ culties. Actually, in the case of the reduced-form productivity regression, this endeavor brings us back to the paradigm of Marschak and Andrews (1944) . As such, it involves framing a structural model composed of a production function, a demand function, a pricing rule, cost share equations for variable input factors, potentially taking into account some type of worker heterogeneity and separate wage equations for di¤erent types of workers. is de…ned as
is not missing, otherwise equal to
(taking advantage of the availability of three year pre-sample accounting …rm observations when necessary). Table 2 : Reduced-form models of productivity and wage determination:
Industry-speci…c relative b . Similar formulas apply if the dependent variable is the worker wage w j(i)t .
. Spearman's rank correlation is reported. Wilcox'robust correlation is reported in square brackets.
Signi…cant at 5%, signi…cant at 10%. Relative extent of rent sharing Subscript "prod" denotes rent-sharing estimates obtained from the reduced-form model of productivity.
Subscript "wage,f" denotes rent-sharing estimates obtained from the reduced-form model of wage determination using the …rm average wage as the dependent variable.
Subscript "wage,w" denotes rent-sharing estimates obtained from the reduced-form model of wage determination using the worker's wage as the dependent variable.
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Abstract This supplement to our paper "Comparing micro-evidence on rent sharing from two di¤erent econometric models" presents (i) in Sections 1 and 2 theoretical structural models with which our econometric reduced-form models of productivity and wage determination are compatible and (ii) in Section 3 detailed estimates and diagnostic tests that we obtain from estimating the reduced-form models of productivity and wage determination.
In Section 1, we present one theoretical structural model behind the econometric reduced-form productivity model that we are able to derive explicitly and which enables us to go from the derived theoretical relationship to the empirical reduced-form productivity equation based on our data.
There are various interpretative schemes behind the expected positive pay-performance link, i.e. behind the wage-pro…t elasticity in the reduced-form model of wage determination, which stem from various underlying theoretical structural models, as noted in Section 1 "Introduction" and Section 5 "Potential sources of discrepancies between rent-sharing estimates"in the main text. In Section 2 of this online supplement, we elaborate on three di¤erent interpretations of such pay-performance relationship which are compatible with three di¤erent theoretical structural models: collective bargaining models, an optimal labor contract model and a search-theoretic model of the labor market. Intuitively, central to collective bargaining models is the existence of workers' bargaining power allowing them to appropriate part of the …rm's surplus. In these models, the pay-performance relationship depends on the relative strengths of the bargaining parties. In optimal contract models in which both workers and …rms are risk-averse, the pay-performance link depends on the ratio of both parties'relative risk aversion parameters. In two-sided search models with wage posting, the main source of rent sharing is competition between …rms to attract workers. Firms have an incentive to hire more workers, thereby reducing search costs. This incentive is particularly pronounced for Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Tinbergen Institute and IZA. y CREST (ParisTech-ENSAE), UNU-MERIT (Maastricht University) and NBER. 1 higher-productivity …rms because they face larger opportunity costs of search. Although the three structural models can be developed analytically, we are not able to estimate them econometrically because of data constraints as this would require having more detailed worker and …rm characteristics. As such, we are not in a position to distinguish between the three potential interpretative schemes empirically.
In Section 3, we present detailed estimates that we obtain from estimating the reduced-form models of productivity and wage determination using the system generalized method of moments (SYS-GMM) estimation method. We also report two diagnostic tests: tests on overidentifying restrictions (instrument exogeneity tests) and a test on lack of second-order serial correlation in the di¤erenced residuals (model speci…cation test).
A theoretical structural productivity model
A …rm i at time t produces output using the following production technology:
with (N it ; M it ) a vector of static inputs in production free of adjustment costs (labor and intermediate inputs) and K it capital treated as a dynamic input in production (predetermined in the short run).
We assume that (i) Q it ( ) is continuous and twice di¤erentiable with respect to its arguments, (ii) a …rm takes the input price of materials as given, (iii) …rms produce in a homogeneous good industry and compete in quantities (play Cournot) 1 and (iv) producers active in the market are maximizing short-run pro…ts.
Let us turn to the oligopolistic …rm's short-run pro…t maximization problem. Firm i's short-run pro…ts, it , are given by:
with R it = P t Q it an increasing and concave revenue function, P t the price of the homogenous good at time t, and W it and J it the …rm's input prices for N and M , respectively, at time t.
Firm i must choose the optimal quantity of output and the optimal demand for intermediate inputs and labor. The optimal output choice Q it satis…es the following …rst-order condition:
the marginal cost of production,
Qt the market share of …rm i, t = @Qt @Pt Pt Qt the own-price elasticity of industry demand and it …rm i's price-cost markup.
The …rst-order condition for the optimal choice of intermediate inputs is given by setting the marginal revenue product of intermediate inputs equal to the price of intermediate inputs:
Inserting Eq. (3) in Eq. (4) and multiplying both sides by
("
From Eq. (5), it follows that pro…t maximization implies that optimal demand for intermediate inputs is satis…ed when a …rm equalizes the output elasticity with respect to intermediate inputs, denoted by ("
, to the price-cost mark-up it multiplied by the share of intermediate input expenditure in total sales, denoted by
. Firm i's optimal demand for labor depends on the characteristics of its labor market. We distinguish three labor market settings (LMS): perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining (PR), strongly e¢ cient bargaining (EB) and static partial equilibrium monopsony (MO).
Under PR, labor is unilaterally determined by …rm i from short-run pro…t maximization, which implies the following …rst-order condition:
with ("
the output elasticity with respect to labor and
the share of labor expenditure in total sales.
In a perfectly competitive labor market model, a …rm takes the exogenously-determined market wage as given. A pro…t-maximizing …rm always chooses employment such that the marginal revenue product of labor equals the wage (Eq. (6)). In the right-to-manage bargaining model, the …rm and its workers bargain over any surplus in order to determine the wage (Nickell and Andrews, 1983) . The …rm continues to choose the number of workers it wishes to employ once wages have been determined by the bargaining process, which implies the same static …rst-order condition for labor as in the perfectly competitive labor market model. The following …rst-order condition with respect to wages must hold at an interior optimum:
where W it represents the worker's alternative wage, it = it 1 it the relative extent of rent sharing with it 2 [0; 1] the part of economic rents going to the workers. 2 2 Eq. (7) results from maximizing a generalized Nash product, the product of the weighted net gains to the …rm and its
Under strongly e¢ cient bargaining (EB), the risk-neutral …rm and its risk-neutral workers negotiate simultaneously over wages and employment in order to maximize the joint surplus of their economic activity (McDonald and Solow, 1981 ). An e¢ cient wage-employment pair is obtained by maximizing a generalized Nash product 3 with respect to the wage rate and labor. The …rst-order condition for wages is given by Eq. (7). The …rst-order condition for labor is given by:
with
the marginal revenue product of labor.
An e¢ cient wage-employment pair is given by solving simultaneously the …rst-order conditions with respect to the wage rate and labor. As such, the equilibrium condition is given by:
Eq. (9) traces out the locus of e¢ cient wage-employment pairs, known as the contract curve. Given
the marginal revenue, we obtain the following expression for the output elasticity with respect to labor by combining Eqs. (7) and (9):
So far, we have assumed that there is a potentially in…nite supply of employees wanting a job in the …rm. A small wage cut by the employer will result in the immediate resignation of all existing workers. However, the static partial equilibrium monopsony model (MO) postulates that the labor supply facing an individual employer might be less than perfectly elastic because workers might have heterogeneous preferences over workplace environments of di¤erent potential employers (Manning, 2003) . Such heterogeneity in e.g. …rm location or job characteristics (corporate culture, starting times of work) makes workers to view employers as imperfect substitutes. This in turn gives employers non-negligible market power over their workers.
Let us assume that the monopsonist …rm is constrained to set a single wage for all his workers and faces labor supply N it (W it ), which is an increasing function of the wage W . Both N it (W it ) and the inverse of this relationship W it (N it ) are referred to as the labor supply curve of this …rm. The monopsonist …rm's objective is to maximize its short-run pro…t function it = R it W it (N it ) N it J it M it , taking the labor supply curve as given. Maximizing this pro…t function with respect to labor gives the following …rst-order condition: 4
3 The generalized Nash product is written as:
it . 4 From Eq. (11), it follows that pro…t maximization implies that the optimal demand for labor is satis…ed when a …rm equalizes the marginal revenue product of labor to the marginal cost of labor. The latter is higher than the wage paid to the new worker W it (N it ) by the amount (W N ) it N it because the …rm has to increase the wage paid to all workers it already employs whenever it hires an extra worker.
Rewriting Eq. (11) gives:
. it 1 represents the wage markdown and
2 < + the wage elasticity of the labor supply curve that …rm i faces, measuring the degree of wagesetting power that …rm i possesses. 5 Rewriting Eq. (12) and using that (R N ) it = Pt(Q N ) it it with (Q N ) it the marginal product of labor, gives the following expression for the elasticity of output with respect to labor:
Using the …rst-order condition for intermediate inputs, we obtain an expression for …rm i's price-cost markup ( it ) and using the …rst-order conditions for intermediate inputs and labor, we de…ne …rm i's joint market imperfections parameter ( it ) as follows:
In order to make this model empirically implementable, we specify two additional assumptions. First, we consider production functions with a scalar Hicks-neutral productivity term and constant technology parameters across a set of producers, i.e. we assume a Cobb-Douglas production technology (where the elasticity of substitution among inputs is equal to one):
it . Second, we assume constant gaps between the output elasticities of labor and materials and their revenue shares, respectively. Taken together, these assumptions imply that the revenue shares for labor and materials are constant across …rms. This constancy of revenue shares is motivated from theory as well as data speci…cities (practical considerations). In particular, we opt to take out sources of variability that our static theoretical model does not explain: …rm-year variations in pro…ts and in adjustment costs which are temporary in nature, i.e. related to the business cycle. Denoting the logs of Q it ; N it ; M it ; K it and it by q it ; n it ; m it ; k it and ! it , respectively, this theoretical 5 Perfect competition corresponds to the case where " N W it = 1, hence (R N ) it = W it . Under monopsony, (" N W ) it is …nite and the labor supply curve that …rm i faces is upward sloping, hence, the …rms sets W it < (R N ) it . As such, the degree of …rm i's wage-setting power decreases in the wage elasticity of its labor supply curve. structural model of productivity implies the following reduced-form model of productivity:
2 Three theoretical structural wage-determination models
Collective bargaining models
In collective bargaining models, rents arise from institutions that arti…cially restrict competition in the labor market, such as some form of employee representation (either trade unions or works councils). Essentially, wages are determined by maximizing a generalized Nash product, which is the weighted product of the …rm's and the workers'net gain from reaching an agreement with the weights represented by the party's bargaining power. Independently of the exact nature of the employment function, the following …rst-order condition with respect to wages must hold at an interior optimum:
where W represents the worker's alternative wage and = R W N JM are short-run pro…ts. R = P Q is total revenue where P is the output price and output Q equals F (N; M; K), with N labor, M material input, K capital and the revenue-shifting parameter being a function of the production technology and the demand for the …nal good. The prices of labor and material input are denoted by W and J, respectively and = 1 represents the relative extent of rent sharing with 2 [0; 1].
Eq. (20) shows that, to a …rst-order approximation, the equilibrium wage is determined by the worker's alternative market wage in the event of a breakdown in bargaining W , the relative bargaining strength of the two parties and the …rm's ability to pay N . As such, the existence of collective bargaining power is predicting a positive pay-performance link As discussed in Section 1, the strongly e¢ cient bargaining model (EB) assumes that the workers and the …rm negotiate simultaneously over wages and employment in order to maximize the joint surplus of their economic activity. The bounds of the bargaining range are given by the minimum acceptable utility levels for both parties. In the absence of an agreement, both parties receive their fallback utility. It is the objective of the workers to maximize U (W; N ) = N W + (N N )W , where N is the competitive employment level (0 < N N ). Consistent with capital quasi-…xity, it is the …rm's objective to maximize its short-run pro…t function:
= R W N JM . In the absence of an agreement, the representative worker receives the alternative wage. If no revenue accrues to the …rm when bargaining breaks down, the …rm's short-run pro…t equals zero in which case the …rm has to bear only the …xed costs of capital. Hence, the generalized Nash product is written as:
The labor hoarding model (LH) is based on two key assumptions. First, there exists overhead labor at the …rm, denoted by N O , which can either be interpreted as a proportion of the workers'time that is paid for but unproductive to the …rm due to e.g. illicit shirking, set-up of machinery or co¤ee breaks, or the proportion of the workforce (rather than the hour) that is paid for but unproductive due to generous crew sizes or overmanning. Second, workers value on-the-job leisure and their preferences are represented by the following objective function:
the degree of overmanning and
the alternative overhead labor ratio. The workers and the …rm negotiate simultaneously over wages and overhead labor while productive labor is unilaterally chosen by the …rm at the pro…t-maximizing level. Assuming that both types of labor are paid the same, the generalized Nash product is now written as:
The right-to-manage model (RTM) postulates that the workers negotiate with the …rm over wages while the …rm chooses its pro…t-maximizing employment level. The generalized Nash product to be maximized now becomes:
where N (W ) represents the optimal employment level chosen by the …rm given the level of the bargained wage.
Eq. (20) results from maximization of (i) Eq. (21) with respect to the wage rate, (ii) Eq. (22) with respect to the wage rate subject to R N P = W , with R N P the marginal revenue of productive labor and N = N O + N P , or (iii) Eq. (23) with respect to the wage rate subject to R N = W , with R N the marginal revenue of labor.
Optimal labor contract model
In a labor contract model with unveri…able e¤ort, the principal (or employer) does not know a priori and with certainty what e¤ort the agent (or employee) has undertaken to achieve the observable performance. The principal is, hence, confronted with a problem of moral hazard. The remuneration rule should depend on observable outcomes that are associated with e¤ort in order to create incentives for the employee to exert the desired level of e¤ort. This remuneration rule will arrive at a compromise between the motives of insurance and incentives. Building on Holmström (1979), we consider a single agent who is contracting with a single principal.
The agent's utility function is given by: U (W; e) = u(W ) c(e), with W the wage he receives, u( ) an increasing and strictly concave function (u 0 > 0; u 00 < 0), e 2 R + his action (e¤ort) and c( ) an increasing and strictly convex cost function (c 0 > 0; c 00 > 0). Let U denote the reservation utility of the agent, representing the minimum amount that he will require for accepting the employment contract.
The action that the agent takes, a¤ects his performance (output). Denote output by Q = Q(e; #) where # 2 R represents the state of nature, and hence the source of risk against which the agent wishes to be insured. Assume that Q e = @Q @e > 0. Denote v( ) the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function of the principal with v(:) a strictly concave function of pro…ts (v 0 > 0; v 00 < 0) and = Q W .
A contract speci…es the remuneration of the agent. It is a mapping W : ! R, with the set of observable and contractible events.
only includes the output performance Q, hence, feasible contracts are of the form W (Q). This principal-agent model focuses on the behavior of a principal and an agent whose decisions unfold in the following sequence. The principal o¤ers a contract W . The agent accepts or rejects the contract. If he rejects, he receives his reservation utility U . If the agent accepts, he chooses e¤ort e. Nature draws # (a random event) that a¤ects the result of the agent's e¤ort Q(e; #). The principal and the agent observe the result Q. The principal remunerates the agent according to the terms of the contract. The principal's problem boils down to determining how the payo¤ Q(e; #) would be shared optimally between the principal and the agent. He chooses the contract that maximizes his utility, anticipating the action that the agent will choose.
Let us suppress # and view Q as a random variable with a distribution parameterized by the agent's e¤ort. Denote F (Qje) the distribution of outcomes Q as a function of the e¤ort level e, assuming that F is twice continuously di¤erentiable and F e (Qje) < 0. The latter, which is implied by Q e > 0, assumes that an increase in e leads to a …rst-order stochastic-dominant shift in F . Letting and ' be the multipliers associated with respectively the participation constraint and the incentive compatibility constraint where the latter is replaced by the …rst-order condition of the agent, the Lagrangian of the principal's problem is written as:
Pointwise optimization of the Lagrangian yields the following characterization of a second-best sharing rule:
The conditions reduce to Borch's (1962) rule for …rst-best risk sharing if the incentive compatibility constraint is slack (' = 0). If ' 6 = 0, the incentive compatibility constraint is binding and there is an incentive-insurance trade-o¤. Hence, the optimal contract is second best. Intuitively,
measures how strongly the principal is drawing inferences about the agent's e¤ort choice e from the realizations of Q. The characterization in Eq. (25) states that penalties or bonuses expressed in terms of deviations from optimal risk sharing should be paid in proportion to this measure.
Eq. (25) de…nes an implicit function linking pro…ts and wages. Di¤erentiating Eq. (25) gives:
If a high-output realization is good news about the agent's e¤ort, which corresponds to the statistical assumption of the distribution of outcomes conditional on the agent's action choice satisfying the monotone likelihood ratio property Combining Eqs. (26) and (25) gives: (27) with r f = v 00 ( ) v 0 ( ) and r w = W u 00 (W ) u 0 (W ) denoting the …rm's and the worker's relative risk aversion, respectively. Eq. (27) shows that the pay-performance link depends on the ratio of parties'relative risk aversion.
Search-theoretic model of the labor market: Wage posting and directed search
We present a competitive search model which considers an environment where employers post wages ex ante and unemployed workers direct their search to the most attractive workers (Moen, 1997) . In this model, frictions in the labor market cause …rms to pay higher wages in order to increase the ‡ow of workers and to reduce search costs. Paying higher wages as an optimal response to the frictions in the labor market is particularly pronounced for high-productivity …rms since they face higher opportunity costs of search. Let us …rst de…ne the behavior of the workers. Consider a worker facing a menu of di¤erent wages. U is the highest value that he can get by applying for a job at some …rm. A worker is willing to apply to a particular job o¤ering a wage W W only if the arrival rate of jobs to workers
is su¢ ciently large, such that:
In equilibrium, workers are indi¤erent about where to apply. Therefore, q adjusts to satisfy Eq. (28) with equality.
Let us now de…ne the strategy of the …rm. Eq. (28) describes how a change in his wage a¤ects his queue length q. Therefore, the …rm's problem is written as:
with e (q) = m(u;v) v the arrival rate of workers to vacant jobs. Eliminating W using Eq. (28) at equality and using e (q) = q W (q), the …rm's problem is written as:
The …rst-order condition is given by:
Since each employer assumes that he cannot a¤ect U , Eq. (32) implies that all employers choose the same q, which in equilibrium must equal the economywide q . Hence, Eq. (32) characterizes the equilibrium value of U , and the arrival rates W and e . Substituting the value of U from Eq. (32) in Eq. (28) at equality gives the market wage W :
with " e q (q ) = q 0 e (q ) e(q ) the elasticity of e (q ). " e q (q ) 2 [0; 1] by the assumptions of the matching function m.
From Eq. (33), it follows that the wage rule operates as if the worker and the …rm bargained over the rents in the employment relationship (Q W ), with the worker's share given by the elasticity of e (q ). Intuitively, competition among wage setters incentivizes …rms to post high wages in order to attract many workers. This incentive is particularly true for higher productivity …rms as they face larger opportunity costs of search.
Substituting Eq. (33) into Eq. (29) determines the number of vacancies, which is equivalent to the …rm's pro…ts ( ) under the assumption of a …xed number of vacancies:
Combining Eqs. (33) and (34) establishes a positive link between wages and pro…ts:
3 Detailed estimates from the reduced-form productivity and wage determination models
Our comparative analysis sample is based on con…dential databases maintained by INSEE (the French "Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques"): …rm accounting information from EAE ("Enquête Annuelle d'Entreprise"), supplemented by matched …rm-worker data drawn from the DADS (the administrative database of "Déclarations Annuelles des Données Sociales"). We end up with a matched …rm-worker panel data sample, consisting at the …rm level of 109,199 observations for 9,849 …rms over the 18 years 1984-2001 , and at the worker-…rm level of 382,501 observations for 60,294 workers in the 9,849 …rms. The comparative analysis sample is broken into 25 manufacturing industries de…ned on the basis of the 2-and 3-digit level of the French industrial classi…cation ("Nomenclature économique de synthèse"). These are industries where we expect rent sharing to be predominant. They amount to 66% of the …rms and 58% of employment in total manufacturing. This high prevalence might be explained by the fact that the government often extends the terms of industry-level bargaining agreements to all employers, implying that collective bargaining coverage is very high (around 95%), making a comparative rent-sharing analysis particularly relevant. Table 1 presents the number of …rms and the number of observations for each industry in the comparative analysis sample.
<Insert Table 1 
about here>
In order to get consistent estimates of the parameters in the reduced-form productivity and wage determination models, we apply the system generalized method of moments (SYS-GMM) estimation method. As mentioned in the main text, this method is designed for panels with relatively small time and large cross-sectional dimensions, covariates that are not strictly exogenous, unobserved heterogeneity, heteroscedasticity and within-…rm autocorrelation. We build sets of instruments following the Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988)-approach which avoids the standard two-stage least squares trade-o¤ between instrument lag depth and sample depth by including separate instruments for each time period and substituting zeros for missing observations. To avoid instrument proliferation, we only use 2-and 3-year lags of the instrumented variables as instruments in the …rst-di¤erenced equation and the 1-year lag of the …rst-di¤erenced instrumented variables as instruments in the original equation. We use the two-step SYS-GMM estimator which is asymptotically more e¢ cient than the one-step SYS-GMM estimator and robust to heteroscedasticity, and the …nite-sample correction to the two-step covariance matrix developed by Windmeijer (2005) .
The consistency of the SYS-GMM estimator depends on the validity of the instruments and the absence of serial correlation in the error term. To address these concerns, we report two diagnostic tests suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) : tests on the validity of the instruments and a test on lack of second-order serial correlation in the …rst-di¤erenced residuals.
The validity of GMM crucially hinges on the assumption that the instruments are exogenous. We report both the Sargan and Hansen test statistics for the joint validity of the overidentifying restrictions since the Sargan tests do not depend on an estimate of the optimal weighting matrix and are hence not so vulnerable to instrument proliferation. On the other hand, they require homoskedastic errors for consistency which is not likely to be the case. As documented by Andersen and Sørensen (1996) and Bowsher (2002) , instrument proliferation might weaken the Hansen test of instrument validity to the point where it generates implausibly good p-values (see Roodman, 2009 for a discussion). In addition to the Hansen test evaluating the entire set of overidentifying restrictions/instruments, we provide di¤erence-in-Hansen statistics to test the validity of subsets of instruments.
The assumption that there is no serial correlation in the error terms of the levels equation can be tested by testing for serial correlation in the …rst-di¤erenced residuals. If the error terms of the levels equation are not serially correlated, the …rst-di¤erenced residuals should exhibit negative …rst-order serial correlation but no second-order serial correlation. The reported m1 -and m2 -tests test for respectively …rst-order and second-order serial correlation in the …rst-di¤erenced error terms.
Estimates from a reduced-form model of productivity
We estimate the following reduced-form model of productivity for each industry I 2 f1; : : : ; 25g:
, where i is a …rm subscript and t a year subscript. The variables q it ; n it ; m it and k it are respectively for each year the logarithms of output Q it , labor N it , material input M it and capital K it . s N and s M are the average shares of labor costs and material costs in total revenue. The parameters , = 1 and are respectively the parameters of price-cost markup, relative extent of rent sharing and elasticity of 12 scale. ! it is an index of "true"total factor productivity, or productivity for short, i a …rm-speci…c e¤ect, t a year e¤ect and it an idiosyncratic error term. Table 2 reports the computed input shares, estimates of output elasticities b "
and scale elasticities, joint market imperfection parameters b = c , price-cost markups and extent of rent sharing, and diagnostic tests generated by the reduced-form productivity model using the SYS-GMM estimator. We denote the relative and absolute extent of rent-sharing parameters b and b , respectively obtained by the reduced-form productivity regression by superscript "prod ". The industries in Table 2 are ranked according to b prod I
.
Data limitations precluded us from using exogenous …rm demand shifters as a source of variation in input demands. We follow a common instrumentation strategy in the literature, which is using lagged internal values. More speci…cally, we use the 2-and 3-year lags of the inputs as instruments in the …rst-di¤erenced equation and the 1-year lag of the …rst-di¤erenced inputs as instruments in the original equation for identi…cation. Table 2 shows that the Sargan test statistic fails to con…rm the joint validity of the moment restrictions, which might be due to the existence of heteroscedasticity. In 5 out of the 25 industries (ind. I = 2; 4; 5; 19; 23), the Hansen test also rejects the joint validity of the identifying restrictions. For industry I = 2; 5; 23, the di¤erence-in-Hansen tests reject the exogeneity of the 1-year lagged …rst-di¤erenced inputs as instruments in the levels equation.
<Insert Table 2 about here>
Estimates from a reduced-form model of wage determination
We recover two sets of rent-sharing estimates from a reduced-form model of wage determination for each industry I 2 f1; : : : ; 25g. The …rst set is obtained by estimating the regression model
, where i is a …rm subscript and t a year subscript. The variables w it , w it , it , k it and n it are respectively for each year the logarithms of the …rm labor cost per worker or average wage W it , the average workers' alternative wage or reservation wage W it , the …rm pro…ts it 7 , the …rm capital K it , and the …rm number of employees N it . i is the …rm e¤ect, t the year e¤ect and it an idiosyncratic error. In this speci…cation, we do not take into account that high-pro…t …rms may pay higher wages because they employ high-skilled workers, not because their wages are higher for workers of a given ability. We only indirectly control for di¤erences in …rms'labor composition through including capital intensity as a regressor.
The second set is obtained by estimating the regression model w j(i)t = 0 + 1 w it + 2 ( it n it ) + 3 (k it n it ) + j(i) + i + t + it , where j(i) is a subscript of worker j in …rm i. The variable w j(i)t is for each year the logarithm of the net earnings of worker j in …rm i or the net wage W j(i)t , and j(i) is the worker-…rm e¤ect. In this speci…cation, we control for inter…rm di¤erences in workers' skills.
The parameter of interest in both regression models is 2 , which is the elasticity of wages with respect to pro…t per employee. In addition to this estimated elasticity, Table 3 also reports estimated elasticities of wages with respect to (i) the alternative wage b 1 and (ii) capital intensity b 3 , and diagnostic tests generated by the reduced-form models of wage determination. In Table 3 , we denote the estimated elasticities obtained by the …rst regression model by superscript "wage,f "(see …rst part of Table 3 ) and the ones obtained by the second regression model by superscript "wage,w " (see second part of Table 3 ). We use the same ranking as in Table 2 Similar to the reduced-form model of productivity, we lack exogenous …rm demand shifters as a source of variation of pro…ts that does not impact directly upon wages. Therefore, we also follow common practice and use lagged values of …rm pro…tability as instruments. More speci…cally, we use the 2-and 3-year lags of the smoothed pro…ts-per-employee variable as instruments in the …rst-di¤erenced equation and the 1-year lag of the …rst-di¤erenced smoothed pro…ts-per-employee variable as instruments in the original equation for identi…cation. Table 3 shows that for both sets of estimates, the Sargan test rejects the null of exogeneity of the instruments in all industries.
Focusing on the …rst set of estimates (using w it as the dependent variable) reveals that the Hansen test only fails to con…rm the joint validity of the identifying restrictions in 3 out of the 25 industries (ind. I = 12; 13; 19). The di¤erence-in-Hansen tests suggest that the 1-year lagged …rst-di¤erenced smoothed pro…ts per employee as instruments in the levels equation may be to blame (exogeneity rejected).
Focusing on the second set of estimates (using w j(i)t as the dependent variable) shows that the Hansen test rejects the joint validity of the moment conditions in 23 out of the 25 industries. For 3 out of these 23 industries (ind. I = 14; 21; 25), the di¤erence-in-Hansen tests reject the exogeneity of the 1-year lagged …rst-di¤erenced smoothed pro…ts-per-employee variable as instruments in the levels equation. The di¤erence-in-Hansen tests additionally reject the validity of (i) the 2-year lags of the smoothed pro…ts-per-employee variable as instruments in the …rst-di¤erenced equation for 2 industries (ind. I = 5; 24), (ii) the 3-year lags of the smoothed pro…ts-per-employee variable as instruments in the …rst-di¤erenced equation for 2 industries (ind. I = 17; 18) and (iii) the 2-and 3-year lags of the smoothed pro…ts-per-employee variable as instruments in the …rst-di¤erenced equation for 7 industries (ind. I = 1; 4; 7; 10; 13; 19; 20) . For 6 out of these 23 industries (ind. I = 2; 6; 9; 11; 22; 23), only the use of the 2-and 3-year lags of the smoothed pro…ts-per-employee variable as instruments in the …rst-di¤erenced equation does not prove informative.
<Insert Table 3 about here> , respectively
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